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CAPITALISM BY DEMOCRATIC DESIGN IN THE POST-
LENINIST UKRAINE: THE FAILURE OF THE LIBERAL 
TRANSFORMATION PROJECT? 
The article aims at analyzing the constellation of domestic and international factors thai have 
led Ukrainian transformation efforts to standstill and produced long-term deteriorating outcomes 
for all spheres of society and major segments of population. The paper also questions the validity 
of background assumptions of "transitology " and attempts to evaluate their relevance to the analy­
sis of post-Leninist Ukraine socio-political realities. Research strategy employed in the paper 
seeks to combine findings of the world system perspective and state-centered approach as well as to 
invoke classical social and political theory tradition for the analysis of the post-Leninist socio­
political transformation. 
In analyzing Ukraine's prospects of 
"integration into the world community" and 
"transition to democracy and market" scholars 
and policy-makers have often tended to neglect 
the complex interplay of domestic and 
international factors influencing these processes 
and therefore overlooking the vicious circle in 
which the post-Leninist societies have found 
themselves. Successful integration of the post-
Leninist regimes into global world system is 
considered to be a natural outcome of rapid 
transition to democracy and market but the very 
transition needs to be boosted by already 
achieved integration into the "world community". 
President Kuchma has recently presented a 
paradigm example of misunderstanding coupled 
with intentional misrepresentation of the realities 
of world system workings, while talking about 
Ukraine's prospects of integration into Europe. 
In one of his recent interviews Mr. Kuchma has 
called Ukraine a "young European state" [1]. That 
territory of Ukraine lies in Europe is well known 
and undeniable fact of physical geography. 
Unfortunately that does not automatically make 
Ukraine "European state". The real question is 
whether Ukraine as political community meets 
criteria required for the integration into the Europe 
perceived in cultural, economic, and political 
terms as a crucial part of world system core. 
The world system approach sought to identify 
"the social system in which capitalism had grown 
as a single social system and to study that 
system as a totality. ...The single social system 
Wallerstein identified was the capitalist world 
economy. It was not the loose collection of 
capitalist nation-states discussed by previous 
authors, but an economic entity..." [2]. 
According to Wallerstein, the world system 
consists of core formed by the developed 
capitalist states which includes Western Europe, 
North America and Japan, periphery which can 
be defined as underdeveloped areas outside the 
core exploited by the latter, and the semi-
periphery- countries "that are neither among 
the most advanced nor the clearly peripheral" 
[3]. Semi-peripheral societies - countries like 
Brazil or South Africa - are engaged into the 
struggle to upgrade their position within world 
system to core status. Wallerstein's analysis of 
the singularity of Russian empire economic 
development and modernization concluded that 
Russia with its numerous dependent areas -
including Ukraine among many others -
"became a kind of "world economy" of its own... 
.. .Neither highly developed nor peripheralized, 
its strong state and relative economic autonomy 
allowed it to enter the world system as a semi-
periphery and, eventually, to challenge capitalist 
system itself' [4]. The former Soviet Union was 
capable of establishing the "world system of 
socialism" based upon organizational and 
ideological principles completely opposite to 
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those of the global capitalism. Thus, the collapse 
of the Leninist system has initially left Ukraine 
outside the world system regardless of its role 
as the founding member of UN. Preservation 
of the initial status of newly independent Ukraine 
as an outsider was undesirable for elites and 
masses because of its clear economic, political 
and ideological disadvantages and discomforts 
rooted in the social memory of Soviet practices 
and experiences of self-exclusion and manifested 
by more contemporary examples of countries 
like Iraq, Minhma and North Korea. Though 
reluctantly and inconsistently the ideological 
choice has been made in favor of joining the 
West or in other words developed world of the 
capitalism. But there is a wide gap between 
articulation of ideological priorities, policy 
statements, real policy decisions, and, more 
importantly, decisions' implementation. 
The core of the modern capitalist system has 
enjoyed remarkable stability - since its formation 
approximately one hundred years ago it has seen 
only one successfully accomplished attempt to 
join the club of the few chosen - Japan. In this 
respect it is highly significant that Japan's case 
has routinely been referred to as a miracle. 
During first years of Ukrainian independence 
the rejection of the legacies of the Soviet past 
and the desire to join the civilized world- post-
Soviet rhetorical substitute for the world capitalist 
system core - were dominant attitudes at the level 
of personal dispositions and important component 
of policy-makers vocabulary. Nevertheless, 
making a bid for the membership in a core was 
obviously unrealistic task given the state of 
domestic affairs and international situation but 
even obtaining the status of periphery or semi-
periphery within the world system requires 
successful handling of developmental/ 
transformation task and favorable external 
conditions since country's integration with a world 
system is possible only through existing 
international institutions usually dominated by 
system's core. Obviously that the issues of internal 
development - interaction of the state, political 
society, civil society, economy and sociocultural 
orientations are of critical significance for the 
political and economic integration into the world 
of advanced capitalist democracies. 
Abortive Development of the Civil 
Society in Ukraine 
Ukraine is experiencing multi-dimensional 
transformation which involves different forms 
of interaction amidst major societal spheres -
state, political society, civil society, political 
culture, and economy. For some Ukrainian social 
science the solution of the problems emerging 
in the course of transformation - establishment 
of political, economic and social institutions of 
modern mass society and creation of modern 
society's system of normative orientations lies 
in the sphere of civil society perceived as a 
distinct, separate entity of Platonic ideas bent. 
Though ill-defined, the notion of civil society has 
become a buzzword for Ukrainian scholars. 
For instance, according to Kyiv based 
sociologist Yevhen Holovakha the main 
contradiction of the Ukrainian societal 
development "is a conflict between obsolete 
totalitarian structures of administration and civil 
society" [5]. At first glance this approach seems 
to be congruent with Dahrendorf s idea of "civil 
society as a key" to the understanding of the 
revolutions of 1989 and subsequent events [6]. 
But it is questionable whether Ukraine has 
developed network of institutions and 
corresponding norms, values, and attitudes, 
generally "habits of heart" (R. Bellah) that 
constitute civil society. Moreover, anti-totalitarian 
movements that emerged in the totalitarian 
societies of the Leninist type did not 
automatically become liberal-democratic. As 
Bruce Parrot has pointed out "it is important to 
inquire whether all the activists who tenaciously 
championed the concept of civil society as a 
source of resistance to communism have been 
capable of making a postcommunist transition 
to tolerance and cooperation with groups whose 
central values and concerns differ from their 
own. Put differently, not all dissidents and 
anticommunist groups were liberals" [7]. Soviet 
anti-totalitarian movements often were acting 
well within the boundaries set up by polarizing 
discourse of Leninism. The same pattern of the 
birth and dissolution of the civil society has been 
thoroughly discussed by Korbonski in his analysis 
of the Polish case [8]. Mesmerized by the 
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attfactive formula "civil society against the state" 
- coined by Andrew Arato to conceptualize 
events taking place in a totally different setting 
- Ukrainian social scientists have reduced the 
role of another important institution - the state 
- to the role of main hindrance to the self-
regulating evolution of civil society and market 
order. Such account is obviously self-
contradictory and thus false - it is assigning to 
the state a great autonomy from the society as 
far as its reluctance to embark on reforms is 
concerned and simultaneously it is denying 
state's autonomy interpreting it as an "executive 
committee" - in terms of orthodox Marxism -
of powerful corporate and regional interest 
groups. This Manichean approach that 
mythologizes both the state and civil society 
attributing to them characteristics of absolute 
evil and absolute good respectively fails to grasp 
the analytical, not ontological, distinctiveness of 
these spheres and their mutual penetration - the 
condition necessary for modern liberal 
democracy in general and civil society in 
particular. It also falls short in understanding the 
historical dynamics of the civil society and its 
roots in the West. Perhaps it is more productive 
to think of Ukrainian so-called national-
' democratic "struggle for recognition" - in terms 
of Axel Honneth - as a resistance movement 
rather than the institute of proto-civil society. 
The relationship between state and (civil) society 
is never simple, hence firstly "there is no single 
locus of great refusal..." [9] and secondly, there 
is nothing a priori "good" about civil society; 
every individual case has to be analyzed in its 
own terms. In a light of Foucault's notion of 
governmentality "the practices of government 
are... multifarious and concern many kind of 
people.., so that there are several forms of 
government among which the prince's [external] 
relation to his state is only one particular mode... " 
[10]. Thus state and society mutually 
presuppose each other's existence and reflect 
each other's character. 
Moreover, if Brezhnev's rule created 
bourgeois civil society of nineteenth century type 
so vividly described by Marx- within routinized 
Leninist political system [11], the Leninist 
extinction removed all constraints from it 
transforming the society as a whole into a loose 
association of individuals where each person 
"acts simply as a private individual (italics 
original), treats other man as means, degrades 
himself to the role of a mere mean, and becomes 
the plaything of alien powers" [12]. 
As Axel Honneth's study has convincingly 
shown "the normative idea of a just society is 
empirically confirmed by historical struggles for 
recognit ion" [13] and requires legally 
institutionalized relations of universal respect for 
autonomy and dignity of persons as well as 
networks of organic solidarity and shared values. 
Ralf Dahrendorf in more sociologically oriented 
interpénétration of this thesis emphasized the 
crucial importance of the public virtues which 
commit individuals to getting along with others 
as necessary condition for the existence of civil 
society and democracy [14]. It is more realistic 
to see Ukrainian society as dominated by private 
values at the expense of public ones. As Ken 
Jowitt has bluntly put it "in a curious, unintended, 
and highly consequential way, Leninist rule 
reinforced many of the most salient features of 
traditional culture throughout Eastern Europe 
(the Soviet Union and elsewhere). ...Leninist 
experience in Eastern Europe (and elsewhere) 
reinforced the exclusive distinction and 
dichotomic antagonism between official and 
private realms. ...Regime-coerced political 
activity (not participation) sustained and 
heightened the population's psychological and 
political estrangement. At the same time, the 
party could not be everywhere. So Leninist 
parties traded de facto privatization in nonpriority 
areas for active Party control and penetration 
of priority areas. This became particular true 
during the Brezhnev period, when the private 
egoism - personalism (italics in original) not 
individualism - became the major sociocultural 
reality" [15]. In other words, "civil society is 
more than economic and legal sociology; it is 
political culture (italics added)" [16]. Ukrainian 
proto-civil society activities sought to destroy the 
Soviet rule but apart from ideal interests of 
national and civil liberation as well as cultural 
revival - ideas shared mostly by intellectuals -
the masses' attitudes were shaped by primitive-
rational calculation of material self-interest. 
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Regime change and independence were 
conceived as means of improving Ukrainians 
welfare. The unexpected outcome was a 
transformation of just emerged public into 
masses - "rational" calculation of egoistic self-
interest based on assumption of unequal 
economic exchange with a "Moscow Centre" 
which can be altered only through achieving 
political independence and economic autarky 
turned out to be a new version of old 
anthropological concept of "limited good" [17] 
typical for traditional peasant societies. 
From the point of view of social sciences 
epistemology this desperate search for civil 
society, liberal orientations, democratic 
institutions, constituency for reform has reflected 
Western scholarly community of experts on 
Leninist/post-Leninist societies strive to make 
its subject-matter legitimate and intelligible 
through the application of common political 
science vocabulary and thus underline validity 
of their scientific claims in eyes of those scholars 
who deal with more recognizable realities of 
liberal regimes [18]. In contemporary Ukraine 
the universal solidarity, sphere of fellow-feeling 
or Gesellschaft as a Gemeinschaft [19] as 
necessary prerequisite of civil society is 
substituted by "ghetto" political culture when 
any political involvement means "trouble" [20] 
and Hobbesian principle of force and fraud. They 
remain to be dominant type of Ukrainian society 
discourse. Another critically important point for 
the civil society emergence is the presence of 
Western type citizenry - phenomenon totally 
foreign to Ukraine's past and present where 
significant segments of population continue to 
define themselves in terms of Soviet "civic" 
identity. 
The Dynamic of Political Society and 
State 
Leninist legacy of neopatrimonial structure 
of domination continues to shape the mode of 
Ukrainian state and political society 
developments. That Ukrainian polity is deprived 
of major Weberian characteristics of modern 
state has become a common place in the 
discussion of Ukrainian politics. The adoption 
of the constitution with a strong flavor of the 
French fifth republic under the circumstances 
of complete absence of the French democratic 
tradition could create only short-lasting 
impression ofdecisive breakthrough in terms of 
the establishing legal framework for state 
building and political society construction. 
Political society in Ukraine remains 
fragmented and unsteady making Ukrainian 
political elite a disunited one. Ken Jowitt 
provided - compelling as usual - empirical 
evidence for this argument when he wrote soon 
after the institutional extinction of Leninism: 
"most opposition elites in Eastern Europe had 
minimal insulation from the intrusive punitive 
presence of their Leninist adversaries, minimal 
familiarity with one another and "politics as 
vocation", and minimal success in bonding with 
a politically loyal social constituency. Only 
Poland, over almost two decades, did a 
counterelite enjoy a Yenan-like protective/ 
interactive experience; one that produced a 
contentious, but mutually tolerant and intelligible, 
elite that cohered, and even in its current divided 
and divisive state offers Poland something more 
important than either marketization or civil 
society: an "established elite". An "established 
elite" is one that recognizes the legitimate places 
of all its members in the polity despite genuine 
and deeply felt party, policy, and ideological 
differences; has worked out civil and practical 
modes of interaction; and can identify and 
organize a sociopolitical constituency in a regular 
manner" [21]. The absence of established elites 
has made impossible the development of political 
parties capable of mediating societal interests 
as well as the formulation and implementation 
of public policies through the winning the maj ority 
in legislature. 
Transitologists often take for granted a 
reformist character of ruling post-Leninist 
establishment. This raises the problem of 
establishing more or less testable criteria for 
determining "reformist" orientation of the given 
regime's long-term policy goals. 
As a distinguished student of modern 
organizations Amitai Etzioni teaches us "the 
researcher will define as the real goals (italics 
in original) of the organization those future states 
toward which a majority of the organization's 
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means and the major organizational 
commitments of the participants are directed, 
and which, in cases of conflict with goals which 
are stated (italics in original) but command few 
resources, have clear priority. Sometimes 
establishing intimate contact with key 
participants allows the researcher to 
determine how aware informants are of any 
discrepancy between real and stated goals. 
Generally, however, it is unwise to depend 
entirely on interviews for information on an 
organization's real goals. An examination 
of resources and direction of effort is often 
a necessary complementary research 
method for obtaining satisfactory results 
(italics added)" [22]. The application of this 
criteria definitely rules out any claim about the 
reformist nature of Ukrainian ruling 
establishment policy orientation. It also reveals 
the total irrelevance of claims defining Kuchma's 
present path as "pursuit of reform in tacit 
alliance with important industrial and 
entrepreneurial interests" [23], the statement 
supported only by uncritically selected reference 
to mythical improvement of macroeconomic 
indicators [24]. 
Impersonal practices and norms of modern 
rational-legal state have been greatly influenced 
by the experience of ascetic Protestantism 
because Protestant "sect opposes the charisma 
of office and insists upon "direct democratic 
administration" by the congregation and upon 
treating the clerical officials as servants of 
congregation" [25]. Ukrainian state formation 
has so far born a great resemblance to the 
absolutist Europe's mode of state making as 
organized crime [26]. As Ken Jowitt has spelled 
it out "it is not enough to point out that most 
citizens in liberal capitalist democracies (certainly 
in the United States) themselves fail to vote and 
are poorly informed about issues and basic 
premises of democracy. The institutional 
framework, the practice and habits of elites, and 
the sociocultural constitutions in these countries 
assign critically different meaning to events in 
Western democracies and Eastern European 
countries" [27]. New institutions of Ukrainian 
state and political society attempt to recapitulate 
Western liberal democratic patterns of political 
organization and policy choices, but the 
resemblance of structures does not automatically 
lead to the similarity of values and patterns of 
behavior let alone institutions' legitimacy. This 
pattern of activities is far from Weberian 
procedural rationality of methodical acquisition 
of economic and political resources. 
Moreover, in a light of Weber's distinction 
between feudalism and patrimonialism it is more 
productive to think of Ukrainian state in terms 
of patrimonial polity: "we shall speak of a 
patrimonial state (italics original) when the 
prince organizes his political power over 
extrapatrimonial areas and political subjects... 
just like the exercise of his patriarchal 
power...The establishment of a "political" 
domination... implies an affiliation of authority 
regulations which differ only in degree and 
content, not structure" [28]. This arrangement, 
contrary to ideal-typically defined structures of 
feudalism rests upon the "benefice" which is "a 
life long, not a hereditary, remuneration for its 
holder in exchange for his real or presumed 
services; remuneration is an attribute of the 
office, not of the incumbent" [29]. No doubt that 
Ukrainian state's capacity for autonomous action 
is experiencing institutional constraints, 
especially in comparison with its Soviet 
predecessor but no less important is the absence 
of psychological determination to undertake 
an independent action. The absence of such a 
determination correlates with the value-
normative disorientation of policy-makers, caused 
by the general anomie in Durkhemian sense [30]. 
Despite the deep crisis the state has managed to 
preserve its autonomy - quite different from the 
autonomy of democratic state - vis-a-vis society 
through the mechanism of social production of 
indifference so brilliantly described by Michael 
Herzfeld[31]. 
The success of radical reforms and 
developmental project in general rests upon the 
combination of activities of developmental state 
with an exceptionally high degree of state and 
public actors interaction. Among features 
developmental state must posses are the 
following: "organizational capacity, state 
autonomy and power vis-a-vis dominant 
interests, and the state's interest in seeking 
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development rather static exploitation economy 
and society" [32]. Developmental state policies 
long term effectiveness and efficiency can only 
be assured with public actors participation -
through institutions of civil and political society -
in defining and implementing government's 
agenda. Revival and reinforcement of 
patrimonial structures of domination in 
contemporary Ukraine have reduced democratic 
procedures to mere electoralism deprived of 
social and economic content. In a line perfectly 
coherent with patrimonial polity norms state 
institutions and resources are constantly 
employed by incumbent "masters" - under 
Kuchma administration this has become a 
routine practice - for ensuring victory in 
"democratic" elections and automatically 
providing the regime with legitimacy, especially 
on a world stage. 
Conclusion 
Presented above picture of Ukrainian society 
under the stress of transformation appears to 
be rather bleak. It is obvious that optimistic view 
of Ukraine as a European country that has 
decisively chosen a path to democracy and 
market represents either Utopian escape from 
reality or intentional distortion of it by incumbent 
establishment for pragmatic purposes of 
collective consciousness manipulation. 
It would be extremely unrealistic to expect 
"great transformation" (K. Polanyi) of Ukrainian 
society to happen in a relatively short time span. 
Ukraine can hope only for peripheral status 
within world system and it may take decades to 
obtain this status given the current state of 
domestic affairs. The situation is worsening by 
the lack of psychological readiness of population 
and ruling establishment to define Ukraine's 
identity as a periphery of more advanced world 
system core but this is the only relevant and 
possible goal Ukraine may reach in a feasible 
future. The only alternative Ukraine can choose 
is self-exclusion from the world system and 
defiance of the norms established by the core 
but this is the least preferable and advantageous 
strategy as North Korean and Iraqi examples 
demonstrate. Moreover, the capitalist core has 
developed new sophisticated variants of the old 
stick and carrot policy to deal with "outlaws" 
on a world stage - they can expect oxygen and 
asphyxiation strategies applied to them and 
therefore face full exclusion form the world 
system with all logical consequences of such 
decision. 
The external aid is not a reliable miderpinning 
for post-Leninist Ukraine recovery given its 
limited scope and ineffective use by the 
borrower. Students of international financial 
system and its byproduct - the new world of 
debt - point out that the treatment or rather 
neglect of financial needs of post-Leninist 
countries is comparable with a failure to tackle 
the problems related to African debt. Marshall 
plan for Western Europe after the World War II 
was in equal measure economic and political 
undertaking aiming at putting war torn European 
economies back on their feet and preventing the 
threat of communist takeover in France and Italy. 
"But instead of a Marshal Plan for Eastern 
Europe, the ex-socialist countries were given the 
EBRD, a pathetically small, self-serving regional 
development bank with its potentially helping 
hands tied behind its back. Instead of the 1990s 
equivalent of the $13 billion 1940s dollars -
probably about $ 130 billion - the EBRD ended 
up merely with some $3.4 billion to lend or 
guarantee Instead of a flexible system of 
counterpart funds that could be used for public 
infrastructure like roads, bridges and ports, or 
to finance industrial re-equipment of municipal 
housing, the EBRD was bound, under orders 
from the United States, to dedicate 60 per cent 
of its loans to private sector... Here was a 
development bank pretending that what was 
needed was a profit-making merchant bank" 
[33]. 
As far as domestic developments are 
concerned the state could perform the function 
of the instigator of radical changes as it was in 
case of Asian tigers. To attain such a goal the 
state must be a developmental one. Ukrainian 
state does not possess the features and capacity 
of system building regime with its effective ability 
to penetrate the society - during Brezhnev 
period of Leninist regime the party's rule was 
weakened by the encroachments of the 
tradit ionalist framework of interest 
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accommodation further undermined by the 
deconstruction of party-state and its replacement 
by the neopatrimonial polity of the soft 
authoritarian bent. If the society is a scavenger 
one, the state actors are also likely to succumb 
to the influence oframpant corruption. Under 
these conditions developmental state is possible 
only when it employs the extensive use of 
violence and is prepared to achieve its 
developmental task at high human cost (Chile 
may serve as a classical example) or in its more 
"civilized" version the institutions of 
developmental state in general and its executive 
branch in particular ought to be restricted in their 
actions by publics acting through elaborated 
institutions of political society. 
One might ask what are the causes and 
potential explanations of incumbent regime 
stability and conspicuous absence of civil unrest 
and large scale violence given that population at 
large is showing no trust in state institutions 
while exhibiting increasing dissatisfaction with 
catastrophically deteriorating life standards. 
This problem resembles the puzzle of the Soviet 
regime stability so vigorously discussed by 
Sovietologists not so long ago. The most plausible 
answer has been suggested by Ken Jowitt: "The 
Soviet Union lasted as long as it did, because it 
disciplined (often through terror) most, rewarded 
many, and attracted a strategically loyal few for 
at least fifty of those seventy-four years. Being 
for a certain period totalitarian, and always 
dictatorial did not prevent the Soviet party from 
being what is now fashionably referred to as 
socially "embedded"' [34]. Employing the 
analogous style of reasoning we may arrive at 
the following conclusion - first of all even elites 
in "precarious position do not have to seek 
support from everyone" [35]. Relative stability 
of Ukrainian political arrangement lies in a fact 
that the state has let majority of population 
struggle for survival by its own means (within 
the frameworks of virtual and shadow 
economies), has given many an opportunity for 
self-expression and possibilities for political and/ 
or economic mobility and in a manner strikingly 
akin to its Soviet predecessor has attracted 
strategically important few. Stability, based upon 
such grounds, cannot hope for having longevity 
of the Soviet Union but it may well become a 
long term pattern of the "development" given 
the experience of numerous African and Latin 
American countries. 
Perhaps it is more realistic, instead of placing 
great expectations upon the outcomes of 
Ukraine's " t rans i t ion" to think of the 
transformation of Ukrainian society in terms of 
Tilly's big structures and long processes which 
take considerable amount of time - decades and 
hundreds of years - to complete their cycle. In 
this respect the most salient lesson of the failure 
of Leninist regimes is that even decisive 
breakthrough with a traditionalist past of national 
dependency and "lagging behind" does not have 
lasting effect and cannot substitute for painful, 
slow and non-linear developments towards 
modernity and postmodernity which Western 
societies have gone through. 
If Ukraine is to make a bid for becoming 
truly modern society, it has no alternative but to 
seek linking itself with a capitalist world system 
as its periphery. It is uncertain if this project is 
likely to succeeded given its unpleasant long term 
economic, social, political, and more importantly 
psychological consequences for the majority of 
population. It is naive to assess Ukrainian ruling 
establishment ideological orientations by 
discussing its rhetoric of marketization, 
democratization and Europeanization while 
blaming it for the lack of political will to 
implement these misperceived ideological 
constructions. Transitologists seem to forget the 
basic premises of social science that asserts "not 
ideas, but material and ideal interests, directly 
govern men's conduct" [36] and continue 
demanding the ruling poiïuœ-administrative class 
pull itself out of the mud of policy incoherence, 
incompetence and corruption and push through 
reforms that will undermine its privileged 
position. From this point of view Ukraine's future 
is quite certain - it is a future of a dependent 
periphery; the open question remains whether the 
dominant center will be the capitalist core or 
Russia. But the history is open to alternatives -
popular participation and resistance does make 
a difference. As Charles Tilly has suggested 
drawing upon his own historical account of 
collective action "when people resisted 
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vigorously, authorities made concessions: [38]. The Ukraine's dilemma as a whole -
guarantees of rights, representative institutions, between the desire inspired by universal liberal 
courts of appeal" [37]. capitalism to design market democracy and the 
Perhaps the most telling sign that Ukraine has particular constellation of factors jeopardizing the 
found itself in a stalemate as far as "transition" integrity of social order and threatening to turn 
tasks are concerned is that even such enormously current decay into the stable pattern of systemic 
active promoter of open/civil society in post- degeneration - is too far complex, at least for me 
Leninist countries as financier George Soros is to solve. The only thing is obvious - Ukrainians 
reported to have "given up on Ukraine" because are not going to witness the liberal-capitalist "end" 
it "lacks political will and any kind of leadership" of their history soon. 
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Павло Кутуєв 
ДЕМОКРАТИЧНИЙ ДИЗАЙН КАПІТАЛІЗМУ В 
ПОСТЛЕНШСЬКІЙ УКРАЇНІ: НЕВДАЧА 
ЛІБЕРАЛЬНОГО ПРОЕКТУ ТРАНСФОРМАЦІЇ? 
У статті автор прагне проаналізувати констеляцію внутрішніх і міжнародних факторів, 
що завели зусилля з трансформації українського суспільства у глухий кут і призвели до 
результату, який має руйнівний вплив на всі суспільні сфери та групи населення. 
Досліджується також обгрунтованісгь основних припущень "транзитології" і робиться спроба 
оцініти їх релевантність до аналізу соціально-політичних реалій постленінської України. 
Запропонована дослідницька стратегія є намаганням поєднати світ-системну перспективу 
із підходом, що надає центральної ваги державі, з класичною соціальною та політичною 
теорією задля аналізу постленінської суспільно-політичної трансформації. 
